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(Bolzano, 2nd October 2008) 
 
1. Introduction: wars and their justifications in our time 
 
1.1. In the title of our workshop globalization comes together with tolerance. But I 
have the difficult task to remind you that in the last decades globalization has come 
together with war. As many others, I take 1989 - the fall of the Berlin wall - as a turning 
point. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar structure in 
international relations, a new type of war has emerged and imposed itself. It is definitely 
a conventional war – it is neither an atomic war, nor the threat of it – but a war of a new 
kind. To refer to this unprecedented form of conventional war, some scholars, following 
Mary Kaldor, use the expression “new wars”1, others prefer to speak of ‘global war’2. 
The main feature of these new wars is their radically asymmetric nature: they are fought 
by the United States and by some western countries against single states, each time 
defined for different reasons as “rogue states”3. What characterises these new wars is a 
radical disproportion between the military forces of the subjects engaged in the conflict, 
and, therefore, a radical disproportion in terms of human losses as well. Western states 
fight these new wars with the aim of not suffering any loss, or a negligible number of 
losses. 
 Thus, after 1989, on the historical and political level we witness a return of war, 
in new forms. On the philosophical and ideological level, we observe a return of the 
legitimisation of war, as well. What are the philosophical-political legitimisations of 
these new wars? It is possible to distinguish two types of justifications: a) to begin with 
/ firstly, new wars are justified by reshaping ancient theories. Basically, by selectively 
re-proposing the fundamental notions of the tradition of just war. Many European and 
                                                 
1 See Kaldor 1999. Mary Kaldor points out that most of these new wars originate in contexts which are 
characterized by a crisis of the state and that in most cases these new wars are waged by non  public  or 
institutional subjects. In this paper, I will focus exclusively on one specific category of the new wars: the 
asymmetric wars waged by western counties against the so called  rogue state. See also, Münkler 2005 
2 See Thompson 1988. Among Italian scholars: Galli 2002, D’Orsi 2003 
3 On the asymmetric character of the new wars, among Italian scholars, see Dal Lago 2003, Colombo 
2006. 
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American intellectuals presented the first Iraq war in 1991 as a just war par excellence. 
b) Secondly, these new wars are justified by resorting, more and more over the last few 
years, to new theories and new forms of rhetoric: scholars have dealt with the notions of 
“humanitarian interventions”, wars to defend human rights, wars to export democracy.  
 Let us return for a moment to the Cold War years, that is, to a period 
characterised by the confrontation between nuclear superpowers. During the Fifties and 
Sixties, debates on war were essentially debates on nuclear war. Conventional and 
atomic war were situated on a continuum: the threat that a conventional war may give 
way to an escalation, degenerating in an atomic war, was apparent. Superpowers would 
engage in conventional wars through intermediaries - the so-called proxy wars - from 
Korea to Vietnam. But the atomic war remained the pivot of the debates in moral and 
political philosophy. The atomic war appeared to most scholars as a dead-end, as a war 
without any legitimacy whatsoever, as a fundamentally unjustifiable war4. This scenario 
radically changes with 1989 and the end of the Cold War. War is re-legitimised on a 
large scale. Initially, in 1991, during the first Iraq war, such re-legitimisation took place 
through the reformulation of the criteria of the just war tradition, within a universalistic 
context that recognized the importance of the International Law as stated in the UN 
Chart, in the UN Declarations and later resolutions. In a second moment, the re-
legitimisation of war took place in new terms, and within a context which seriously 
challenged the role of the UN and of classic international law. Formulas such as 
‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘wars promoting human rights’, ‘wars exporting 
democracy’ attest that war has been re-legitimised by resorting to ‘high’ terms and 
concepts of the European and Western tradition, such as humanity, rights, and 
democracy. Thus, creating what many recognize properly speaking as a series of 
oxymora. I am convinced that these restatements of ancient theories and new 
justifications of war should be accurately reconstructed, and their conceptual structures 
and premises criticised, not simply denounced for their rhetorical effects.  
 
1.2. Before taking a closer look at these strategies of re-legitimisation of war, I 
would like to add a remark concerning the global post-1989 historical-political 
                                                 
4 See N. Bobbio, Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace (1964). During the Fifties, some scholars  
attempted to justify the nuclear war: e.g. Karl Jaspers. In the Sixties, some Catholics thinkers attempted to 
conceive a nuclear ethics: on these debates, see James Turner Johnson.  
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situation, namely, the one brought about by the fall of the Berlin wall. An indubitable 
ambiguity characterised that situation, which was read and interpreted, at the time and 
later on, from two extremely different perspectives. a) On the one hand, many 
philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas, conceived it as a first step toward the 
creation of a cosmopolitical order, in some way carrying out the Kantian project of 
perpetual peace; b) on the other hand, it was considered as the first step toward the 
realisation of a political order dominated by a single superpower, acting unilaterally, 
and as the beginning of the unilateral hegemony of the United States. Many scholars 
embracing this second perspective, be they political experts, internationalists, experts in 
strategy, have brought into light how such hegemony or unilateral imperial power has 
been cerefully conceived and planned. They have pointed out that, behind the political 
choices which lead to fight this new type of wars, there is a whole new culture, mainly 
the Neo-con culture, aiming at subverting many of the betrayed political principles, as 
well as the fundamental assumptions of classical international law. 
 
2.. Contemporary reformulations of  just war theory 
 
There has been a variety of reformulations of  just war theory over the last two decades, 
which may be situated at different levels of discourse5. We can distinguish at least two 
levels: a) a strictly philosophical one; b) a level of discourse more directly engaged in 
actual questions, what we may address as a political-ideological level.  
 On the strictly philosophical level, we may refer first of all to John Rawls, who 
in some of his essays, such as Fifty Years after Hiroshima6 and, especially, in the 1999 
book, The Laws of Peoples, takes over and reformulates some of the key-notions of the 
just war tradition. He rethinks these notions in the attempt to extend the principles of 
justice from the national to the international sphere, thus, within the framework of a 
theory of international justice. The theory of just war re-emerges in Rawls’s pages when 
he takes into account, within the context of what he calls the “Nonideal theory”, the 
possibility that “liberal and decent peoples” may be forced into war against what he 
                                                 
5 See Falk 2004 
6 See Rawls 1995 
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calls “outlaw states” or “outlaw regimes”7. I cannot dwell upon his formulations, here. 
It is well-known that Rawls’ project has been widely discussed and criticised, and that 
over the last ten years the literature on international justice, cosmopolitical justice, and 
global justice has grown enormously.  
 On the political-ideological level, a series of reformulations of the theory of just 
war has come to the fore over the last two decades, among which the most famous and 
well-constructed are probably those proposed by Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust 
Wars8 and, more recently, in Arguing about War9. Many scholars tried to propose A 
Reappraisal of just war theory or to directly discuss the problem of Just War in the 
Twenty-First Century, as some recent titles echo10. [It is worth remembering that many 
intellectuals justified the interventions in Iraq in 1991 and in Afghanistan in 2001 by 
resorting to the notions of the just war tradition.]  
 Why reformulate the main assumptions of this important tradition of western 
political philosophy? Why this tradition rather than others? I would reply in the 
following way: because this tradition offered precise standards for judging war. 
Moreover, because this tradition offered the possibility to think in a more articulate way 
the relation among morals, law and politics, besides and beyond the tradition of political 
realism, which does not thematize the relation between morals and politics.  
 At this stage, we should linger over some of the main characters of the just war 
tradition and on its conceptualisations, in order to better investigate the way in which 
these conceptualisations have been retrieved and reformulated during the last decades. 
This would allow us to single out and to bring the distortions and reductions of such 
reformulations into full focus.  
 The tradition of just war has a complex conceptual architecture. As you all 
know, first of all it distinguished and tackled the questions of the legitimacy of war, 
which fell within the category of the jus ad bellum: in this way it focused on the justae 
causae of war,  on the just causes of war, the right authority and  right intent of the 
subjects which wage war. It then conceptualised the problems of the legality of war, 
                                                 
7 See Rawls 1999. On the tensions and difficulties of this work, see at least, the essays published in 
Martin and Reidy 2006. Some interesting issues are also raised by Martin 2003 and by Anderson 2005. 
8 See Walzer 1977 and 2006 4th edition. On Walzer’s  theory of just war, see Orendt 2000, Martin 2003, 
Zolo 2003,  
9 See Walzer 2004 
10 See Evans 2005, Lay 2007, Reed 2008, Rodin 2008. 
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which fell within the category of the jus in bello, formulating, in particular, the criteria 
of discrimination and proportionality11. Finally, it examined the close relation between 
legitimacy and legality, setting down the thesis according to which a legitimate war, that 
could only be fought illegally was to be considered unlawful, thus not to be fought. 
Therefore, by putting legitimacy and legality in relation, and individuating a sort of 
retroactivity of legality on legitimacy, the tradition of just war set precise standards or 
criteria to determine the overall lawfulness of war.  
 Let me add a remark: I think that the complex conceptual structure of the 
tradition of just war, from Aquinas to Vitoria, Suarez and the other authors of the 
second Scholasticism, should be taken seriously. That is to say, it deserves, in my view, 
that we move beyond those representations, which, following Carl Schmitt’s 
interpretation in Nomos der Erde, conceive it as an exclusively pre-modern tradition.  
 Two approaches to the tradition of just war and its contemporary reformulations 
are possible, which lead to two different kinds of criticism. A) On the one hand, there is 
a radical criticism, which I would define as an external criticism. This form of criticism 
rejects this tradition as a whole, by arguing that between the 16th and the 17th centuries it 
was an instrument of legitimisation of European wars, especially, against the Turks and 
the inhabitants of the New World. It argues that its contemporary reformulations are 
sheer rhetorical instruments in order to legitimize the unilateral interventions of the 
United States and the Western countries. B) On the other hand,  an internal criticism 
argues that the conceptual structures of the just war tradition deserve to be taken into 
serious examination, for they aimed not only at allowing, but at strictly limiting war as 
well. Thus, its elaborations cannot be reduced to the sheer rhetoric of legitimisation. 
Modern assumptions of just war should be taken seriously in order to evaluate whether 
their contemporary reformulations are exact or distort and reduce their significance.  
 In this paper, I intend to develop this second approach. Thus, I will examine the 
contemporary reformulations on the backdrop of the classical conceptual architectures 
of the just war tradition. To begin with, it is important to point out that, in the 
contemporary definitions, the questions of legitimacy and legality are separate. The 
emphasis is put entirely on the conditions of the legitimacy of war, that is to say, 
                                                 
11 The jus ad bellum is, in other words, that portion of the tradition that deals with the justification of 
force, while the jus in bello addresses restraints or limits on how force may be used. Among others,  see 
Johnson  1981  and Johnson 1984. 
 6
whether the iustae causae exist or not, as if their existence allowed to fight a war 
without asking further moral questions. The problems of the legality of war and of the 
retroactivity of legality over legitimacy have been superseded, or even disappeared in 
many elaborations. In short, the overall lawfulness of war is reduced to its legitimacy, to 
the existence of the iustae causae.    
 Such reduction and simplification of the tradition’s demanding conceptual 
framework is apparent in several thinkers, who invoke the “logical priority” of 
legitimacy over legality, of the jus ad bellum over the jus in bello.  These authors 
maintain that “the question whether to use force takes logical priority over the question 
of what force to use and conditions of it”, thus transforming such logical priority into a 
moral priority: “the justice of the cause was allowed to override the justice of the 
particular means used to serve the cause”12.  
 By focusing their attention exclusively on legitimacy, on the jus ad bellum, some 
thinkers have forced, or even twisted, the strict criteria of legitimacy set by the tradition. 
In the whole tradition, and in the most different formulations of the just war  theory, a 
just war has always and exclusively been a war waged for self-defence, a war 
responding to a previous offence or a previous wrong. Recently, thinkers, such as Jeff 
McMahan, have drawn this strict principle into question in order to provide a moral 
justification of unilateral policies. They asked themselves whether an aggressive war 
may be permissible: diverging from the standards of the just war tradition, which deem 
aggressive and punitive wars always unjust, McMahan argued that aggressive and 
punitive wars can be just13. 
 The fact of focusing the attention on the legitimacy of war, and not at the same 
time on its legality, on the way in which the war may be carried on as well, has allowed, 
almost without problems,  to judge a series of wars, waged by the US and their 
European allies, as just wars.   
 Now, let us consider the jus in bello. The jus in bello set the criteria of 
discrimination and proportionality, which were to be respected under conditions of 
warfare. First of all, the principle of discrimination, distinguishing between innocentes 
and nocentes,  the innocent and the guilty person, essentially between civilians and 
                                                 
12 See also Johnson, 1984, p. 30 – Against M. Walzer and the argument  of supreme emergency. 
13 McMahan has the legitimisation of unilateral humanitarian interventions in mind, see McMahan 2008  
in May 2008, p. 78. 
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soldiers. Then, the principle of proportionality of the military intervention compared 
with the offence, or wrong, which originated the just war. It is important to point out 
that in their reformulations of just war theories, contemporary thinkers have not dwelled 
on these criteria as deeply as their early modern predecessors, for instance Vitoria.  A 
series of questions have not been sufficiently investigated, and too many answers have 
been taken for granted. For instance: in contemporary conventional wars, who are the 
innocents? Should the soldiers of the armies of authoritarian or totalitarian countries be 
considered innocent or guilty? Referring to a recent historical case, were the ten 
thousands Iraqi soldiers, killed around Bassora in 1991 during the retreat from Kuwait, 
to be considered guilty or innocent? Were they to be deemed responsible for the 
application and the execution of Saddam’s orders? Were they morally responsible for 
the war? Too many thinkers, who have re-proposed a theory of just war over the last 
few years, have failed to elaborate, probably taking it for granted, a theory of collective 
responsibility14. 
 Moreover, I am convinced that many contemporary philosophers have not 
investigated the distinctive characters, the peculiarities of the new wars in depth: first of 
all, the fact that they are fundamentally asymmetric wars. This asymmetry – the fact that 
these wars rely upon a massive use of technological information; that they are 
predominantly air wars, in which the western countries that wage them do not want to 
suffer losses - has not be dwelled upon enough.  In the light of these remarks, in my 
view, the slaughters of civilians, the so-called “collateral damages” of air bombings, 
cannot not be conceived as unintentional and cannot be justifiable through some version 
of the “double effect” doctrine any longer.      
 Many scholars failed to ask themselves the radical question whether 
contemporary wars – the new or asymmetric wars – may actually be limited, or whether 
they should be included in the 20th century war trend, in which civilians are the 
increasingly larger and most significant part of  the victims. 
 In short, it is possible to point out two elements in many of the contemporary 
reformulations of the just war theory. 1) A significant reduction of the restrictive claim 
of the traditional just war theory. Such theory was elaborated, on the one hand, to 
provide, in certain cases, moral justification for the recourse to war; on the other, to 
                                                 
14 On this issue, see the recent essay by Pettit 2007. 
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strictly limit it as well. In more recent formulations, these limits have been significantly 
weakened, or made less restrictive. 2) A significant lack of investigation into the 
structural characters of the new wars.  Philosophers have kept reading philosophers, and 
have not paid sufficient attention to other social sciences, nor read enough works (if 
any) in the fields of strategy, international relations, history and sociology. The question 
whether the theory of just war is adequate to the challenges issued by the new scenario 
of unilateral interventions, ethnic cleansing and international terrorism, the scenario of 
the new wars, seldom has been raised15.  
 
3. Humanitarian wars to promote human rights.  
 
             In the just war tradition, pre-emptive strikes and pre-emptive wars were 
altogether excluded from the definition of lawful war. As I said before, only a war, 
which answered to a wrong previously committed by others, could be a  just war. It 
aimed at re-establishing the law of nature (lex naturae) or the international law (jus 
gentium) which had been violated.  
Over the last decade, pre-emptive war, or unilateral war, has been justified by 
resorting to the theory of human rights, and to the idea that human rights must be 
promoted and implemented also beyond the borders. Thus, a large number of theories of 
humanitarian intervention have been developed, from extremely different metaphysical 
and epistemological premises. One finds a justification of humanitarian military 
interventions even in the subtle and abstract pages of John Rawls, the most important 
Anglo-Saxon political philosopher of the last century especially, in those of The Law of 
Peoples16. Moreover, it is not difficult for philosophers of  Kantian inspiration to found 
human rights deontologically, hence proceeding to the justification of humanitarian 
interventions. For instance, Carla Bagnoli argued that a humanitarian intervention must 
be thought as a perfect duty: it has to be conceived “as a duty rather than permission, 
and as a perfect duty than an imperfect one – a duty that proceeds from the respect of 
                                                 
15 But now see Lee 2007. 
16 See The Law of Peoples, p. 94 : “Is there ever a time when forceful intervention  might be called for? If 
the offenses against human rights are egregious and the society does not respond to the imposition of 
sanctions, such intervention in the defense  of human rights would be acceptable and would be called 
for”. 
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humanity rather than from charity”17. Philosophers far more sceptical about the 
possibility of founding the universality of human rights from a transcendental 
viewpoint, philosophers who took the lesson of Isaiah Berlin over, such as Michael 
Ignatieff, come, in a similar way, although from different paths, to the point of 
defending the use of force. Both in the pages of Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 
and in those of The Lesser Evil. Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Ignatieff argues in 
favour of humanitarian military interventions and considers the military interventions of 
the United States and their European allies in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo perfectly 
legitimate18. Some scholars, such as Fernando Teson, proceed to justifying humanitarian 
interventions by showing that the rights of the individuals have priority over the rights 
of the states, and by arguing “that sovereignty is contingent because the rights of a state 
are derivative of the rights of the individuals who constitute them”19. Others, such as 
Mona Fixdal or Joseph Boyle, are convinced that it is possible to justify humanitarian 
armed interventions on the grounds of a radical reformulation of some of the key-
notions of the just war tradition. Others resort to more controversial notions: Nancy 
Sherman, for instance, grounds our duties to ensure the protection of human rights for 
those outside our borders in our (supposed) common membership in a “global moral 
commonwealth”20.  
It is not possible to examine here the various attempts to justify the so-called 
“humanitarian” armed interventions on the grounds of the different theories of human 
rights, and of different philosophical principles. I would rather mention the fact that two 
types of criticism can be, and have been, addressed to this kind of theories.  The first 
type is an external criticism, which questions the actual universal character of human 
rights. It argues that the theory of human rights lacks both analytical rigour and 
philosophical foundation. In particular, it argues that the human rights enumerated in 
the various Bills of Rights, and discussed in the works of the philosophers, have an 
extremely heterogeneous nature and are characterised by deontic antinomies, which 
frustrate any attempt to provide them with a coherent and unitary foundation. The thesis 
of the normative universality of human rights appears to these critics as the dogmatic 
                                                 
17 C. Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: a Kantian Approach, in T. Nardin – M. S. 
Williams, eds., Humanitarian Intervention – Nomos  XLVII, 2006 , pp. 117-141. 
18 See Ignatieff 2001 and Ignatieff 2004. 
19 See Teson 1997 
20 See Scherman 1998. 
 10
postulate of ethic rationalism and of old and new forms of the doctrine of natural law. In 
their view, such thesis is not confirmed theoretically, and is denied with convincing 
arguments both by western philosophies of historicist and realist orientation, and by 
various expressions of non-western cultures. It is often pointed out that members of 
these cultures reproach to western theories of human rights their claim to universality 
and, particularly, their strictly individualistic character; and that they oppose to them 
other ideals and values - among which, recently, the so-called “Asian values”. 
According to these arguments, the so-called humanitarian interventions are conceived to 
be devoid of real justification, and simply the expression of the unilateral and imperial 
policies of the only superpower left on the international scene.  
Another type of criticism, an internal one, may be addressed to those theories 
which justify military interventions in the name of a humanitarian ideology. For the 
sake of discussion, one can accept the claim of the universality of human rights, and 
investigate the way in which these human rights are promoted or “implemented” 
instead. Thus, it is possible to draw the attention to the end-means relationship. That is 
to say, it is possible to ask the question whether an asymmetric war is an adequate 
means for promoting the end of human rights. It is awkward to observe how most 
reflections concerning the so-called humanitarian interventions are reflections on their 
possible legitimacy. Seldom are they reflections on the effective course of action or on 
the methods of their realisation, and on the problems inevitably raised by such methods.  
Against these simplifications, and the disquieting blindness of a considerable 
part of the Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy, a serious ethical reflection, up to the present 
situation, should at least: a) take the critical contributions of the pacifist tradition into 
account, even though without choosing to adopt its assumptions. And, especially, two of 
its contributions: the constant problematization of  the end-means relation, and a deep 
analysis of the unintended consequences implicit in the recourse to violence. B) It 
should also take Weber’s lesson into account, according to whom, when thematizing the 
relation between ethics and politics, ethics should not be understood exclusively in 
terms of an ethics of the principles, but should incorporate some form of ethics of 
responsibility.  
Due to time limits, these remarks are inevitably schematic. But I would not want 
(don’t want) to give the impression of discrediting the entire Anglo-Saxon moral 
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reflection. For the admirers of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, I would like to remember that 
one of its most important representatives, and one of the most subtle interpreters of the 
contemporary ethical debate, Bernard Williams, in his posthumous book At the 
Beginning was the Deed denounced and distanced himself from what he called 
“Moralism in Political Theory”. Without suggesting a relation of direct subordination, 
he proposed a more problematic relationship between ethics and politics, raising more 
than one doubt on the so-called humanitarian interventions, on their justifications and 
possibilities of realisation21.  
My aim was to criticise some of the philosophical positions, which have 
contributed to justify the military interventions of the United States and their European 
allies over the last twenty years. I essentially attempted to do so from within, taking the 
arguments of those, who reformulated the fundamental notions of the just war tradition, 
and of the theorists of humanitarian interventions seriously.  
Nonetheless, I do not want (either) to suggest that it is impossible to think in a 
fruitful philosophical way over violence and war. I would like to draw the attention to a 
way of philosophizing over the problems of contemporary war, which has emerged over  
the last ten years, and which I consider more congenial. It does not aim at justifying 
military interventions, but at investigating terrorists’ and state violence, its ultimate 
roots and ways of reacting against it. Taking over some of Lévinas’s suggestions, it has 
its starting point in an anthropology developed around the notion of vulnerability. In 
short, I have two works in mind, which are, in my view, exemplary: the first one is 
Judith Butler’s Precarious life. The power of mourning and violence (2004); the second 
is Adriana Cavarero’s 2007 book, Orrorismo, ovvero della violenza sull’inerme. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to develop these thoughts here.  
Allow me to make one conclusive remark. In this paper I attempted to highlight 
some of the awkward silences, the conceptual inconsistencies and the risks of those 
philosophical perspectives, which reformulate the theory of just war or thematize the 
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions on the grounds of the normative theories of 
human rights. I tried to show how, through elaborate conceptual architectures of a  
normative type, these perspectives often ended up legitimizing western military 
interventions, rather than providing elements of criticism. In my introduction, I 
                                                 
21 See two papers written by  Bernard  Williams, in the last years of his life: Realism and Moralism in 
Political Theory; Humanitarianism and the Right to Intervene, now published in Williams 2005. 
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mentioned the fact that many philosophers saw in the fall of the Berlin war the 
possibility (and were in the hope) of the creation of a just cosmopolitical order. And I 
pointed out how many of them have often been self-referential, failing to examine the 
more critical contributions of other social sciences. As a result, they brought arguments 
in favour of the powers that be, legitimising their unilateral choices, instead of bringing 
their dark side into full light. Let me say, to conclude, that I feel the need of and I would 
recommend a philosophical work that centers upon criticism, rather than foundation, 
upon deconstruction (or demistification) rather than legitimisation.. “To understand the 
world through suffering: that is the tragic”, Nietzsche wrote somewhere. I would prefer 
a philosophy, or an intellectual work, which keeps alive, in its conceptual structures and 
in its practice of writing as well, the sense of tragedy, of the endless tragedies around us. 
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